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NO. CIRCULAR ~~MAX~~ CG-245

Nov 8 3 17 PM '58

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Subject: Appraisal of Modification in Rapacki Plan.

There follows Department's analysis of modifications in Rapacki Plan, for use as indicated reference telegram:

Following his return from an official visit to Oslo, Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki held a press conference in Warsaw on November 4 at which he released a statement proposing some "modifications" to the plan which bears his name and which was concerned with the establishment of a demuclearized zone covering East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Based on the text of the statement carried in FBIS, November 5, Rapacki proposes the implementation of his plan in two stages. In his words the two stages are as follows:

"In the first stage a ban would be introduced on the production of nuclear weapons on the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic.

"An obligation would also be undertaken within the proposed zone to renounce the equipping with nuclear weapons of the armies which do not yet possess them as well as the building of relevant installations for them. At the same time, appropriate measures of control would be introduced. . .

"The implementation of the second stage would be preceded by talks on the appropriate reduction of conventional forces. Such a reduction would be

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Drafted by: EUR:EE:HPLeverich:eb:

EUR:RA:RFessenden:eb 11/7/58

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effected simultaneously with the complete denuclearization of the zone. Again it would be accompanied by the introduction of appropriate control measures."

Discussion:

1) The "modifications" suggested by Rapacki are contained in the timing of the application of the Rapacki Plan as represented by the two stages and the inclusion of a provision for the control and reduction of conventional armed forces.

2) The "modifications" are in fact addressed to but one of our fundamental objections to the original proposal, namely that it dealt only with nuclear armament, excluding the problem of conventional armaments and the preponderance of Warsaw Pact forces in this field. The "modifications" do not in any way apply to the other objections; namely, that the Rapacki plan ignores Soviet capability to launch a major nuclear attack from its own territory thus leaving the proposed denuclearized area, strictly limited in scope, dependent upon its good intentions; that it would confirm the continuation of a divided Germany; and that it would thus fail to provide a dependable basis for European security.

3) The "modifications" suggesting the reduction of conventional forces in the proposed denuclearized zone is based on the narrow concept of a balance (at a lower level) of forces in West Germany on the one hand and in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other. It does not come to grips with the fundamental reality of the overall superiority of Warsaw Pact forces in terms of manpower over the West and the Soviet ability because of proximity and in the absence of a nuclear shield to rush their troops into West Germany or elsewhere in Europe before reinforcements could be brought in from other Western sources.

4) The "modifications" do not therefore meet in fact what Rapacki described in his press statement as the key Western argument against his plan. He quoted this argument as follows:

"The implementation of the ban on the production and possession of nuclear weapons in Central Europe would deprive the NATO troops of the so-called nuclear shield in the face of the superiority of the Warsaw pact forces in the field of conventional arms."

5) Since production of nuclear weapons is not now taking place nor presumably seriously envisaged in West Germany or in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the ban proposed in Rapacki's first stage is simply maintenance of the status quo. The proposed obligation constituting the second part of stage one is aimed at preventing the strengthening of the West German army by equipping it with nuclear capabilities and thus virtually eliminating its effectiveness in meeting its obligations as a NATO member. Because of distrust, it is unlikely that the Soviets intend to provide their Eastern European allies with atomic weapons, especially since for geographic reasons there appears to be no real need to do so. By saying in his

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statement that his "modifications" were advanced "in agreement with our allies" Rapacki frankly admits Soviet approval of his action. This is not surprising since these modifications in no way jeopardize Soviet objectives in initially espousing the original Rapacki plan. The Soviets may hope that at best this latest Polish maneuver will create friction among the Western allies and that at least it will yield gains on the propaganda front.

6) It does not necessarily follow from this that the Poles do not have their own reasons for attempting to revive interest in the Rapacki plan in this way. Any limitation on the build-up of West German military strength and the size of its army would be advantageous for Poland if for no other reason than it would obviate the need for additional heavy expenditures to strengthen Polish armed forces in order to match the West German increases. Further, the Poles may see in the Rapacki plan at least a hope for bringing about withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Poland itself and from East Germany. For these reasons and because it represents to some extent the exercise of its own initiative by the Polish Government, Rapacki's action may have internal political advantages in Poland.

Conclusions:

1) Rapacki's proposed "modifications" of his original plan do nothing to alter fundamental US and Western objections to it. Hence they do not merit serious substantive consideration.

2) Rapacki's action is however a clever even though superficial move which on the surface seems sincerely designed as a reasonable measure to meet Western reservations to the Rapacki plan. This professed attitude of reasonableness may achieve a degree of favorable response from some sectors of public opinion in Western countries.

FYI Rapacki modifications are cleverly tailored to appeal to certain segments of opinion in Germany, UK, and Norway. ^{some} ~~SPD~~ ^{leaders} and FDP in Germany have already indicated general endorsement. Modifications are also calculated to meet with favorable response in segments of labor party in UK and may have appeal in Norway, since "two stage" approach is similar to Norwegian proposal considered by NAC END FYI.

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(FDU)

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